Launch on Need is a work of fiction. Names, characters, places and incidents either are the product of the author’s imagination or are used fictitiously. Any resemblance to actual persons, living or dead, events, or locales is entirely coincidental. No part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews. Copyright © 2010 by Daniel Guiteras All rights reserved. ISBN 978-0-615-37221-1 E-Book ISBN: 978-1-4392-8965-5 Published in the United States by T-Cell Books 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 ignition! Printed in the United States of America Cover photo credit: NASA/Diametric Gerondidakis In Memoriam The Crew of Columbia, STS-107 Rick D. Husband CommanderWilliam C. McCool PilotMichael P. Anderson Payload CommanderDavid M. Brown Mission SpecialistKalpana Chawla Mission SpecialistLaurel Blair Salton Clark Mission SpecialistIlan Ramon Payload Specialist Columbia Debris Search Team Jules F. Mier, Jr. Debris Search Pilot Charles Krenek Debris Search Aviation Specialist The crew members lost that morning were explorers in the finest tradition, and since then, everyone associated with the Board has felt that we were laboring in their legacy. Ours, too, was a journey of discovery: We sought to discover the conditions that produced this tragic outcome and to share those lessons in such a way that this nation’s space program will emerge stronger and more sure-footed. If those lessons are truly learned, then Columbia’s crew will have made an indelible contribution to the endeavor each one valued so greatly. (Excerpt from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s Opening Statement.) Columbia Payload Configuration for STS-107 NASA graphic, CAIB Report Vol. I, Page 31 For Lisa, Caitlyn and Emily The three brightest stars in my universe Contents Title Page Copyright Page In Memoriam Introduction Part I The Discovery Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9 Chapter 10 Chapter 11 Chapter 12 Chapter 13 Chapter 14 Chapter 15 Chapter 16 Chapter 17 Chapter 18 Chapter 19 Chapter 20 Chapter 21 Chapter 22 Chapter 23 Chapter 24 Part II The Challenge Chapter 25 Chapter 26 Chapter 27 Chapter 28 Chapter 29 Chapter 30 Chapter 31 Chapter 32 Chapter 33 Chapter 34 Chapter 35 Chapter 36 Chapter 37 Chapter 38 Chapter 39 Chapter 40 Chapter 41 Chapter 42 Chapter 43 Chapter 44 Chapter 45 Part III The Endeavor Chapter 46 Chapter 47 Chapter 48 Chapter 49 Chapter 50 Chapter 51 Chapter 52 Chapter 53 Chapter 54 Chapter 55 Chapter 56 Chapter 57 Chapter 58 Chapter 59 Chapter 60 Chapter 61 Chapter 62 Chapter 63 Chapter 64 Chapter 65 Chapter 66 Chapter 67 Chapter 68 Chapter 69 Chapter 70 Chapter 71 Chapter 72 Chapter 73 Chapter 74 Chapter 75 Chapter 76 Chapter 77 Chapter 78 Chapter 79 Epilogue Bibliography Acknowledgements Introduction ON THE MORNING of Feb. 1, 2003, Space Shuttle Columbia’s international crew of seven astronauts, having spent 16 highly productive days in space, were finally ready to come home. So, to begin their one-hour journey from orbit to Earth, Columbia’s commander and pilot prepared the reentry software and positioned Columbia for a de-orbit burn. Then, at 8:15 A.M. E.S.T. during Columbia’s 255th orbit, they executed a burn lasting precisely two minutes and 38 seconds. The crew was set to touch down at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida at 9:15 A.M. E.S.T. Engineers and managers at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Mission Control were monitoring what seemed like a typical reentry, when suddenly Columbia’s left wing sensors began to fail. First, four hydraulic sensors in the left wing failed; then, five minutes later, both left main landing-gear tires lost pressure. Seventeen seconds later at 8:59:32 A.M. E.S.T., the final transmission from the crew was heard. The crew and space plane were lost. Columbia had been just 16 minutes from home. Less than two hours after Mission Control lost contact with Columbia, NASA officials formed the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. The Board’s mission was to identify the physical and organizational causes of the accident. It spent more than six months analyzing Columbia’s flight data, conducting interviews of key NASA personnel and space shuttle contractors, and reviewing communications between NASA personnel. The Board also enlisted the help of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which directed over 250 organizations and more than 25,000 workers on a foot search of Columbia’s debris field. The field spanned an area of over 700,000 acres from east Texas to western Louisiana. FEMA alone spent over $305 million on the search. When the search concluded, 38 percent of Columbia’s dry weight had been recovered. In August 2003, the Board released its findings in the “Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report.” The report is comprehensive, covering the history of the Space Shuttle Program, the objectives of Columbia’s final mission, astronaut training, accident analysis, key e-mail communications between NASA personnel during the mission and, finally, detailed recommendations to NASA for preventing another accident. The entire CAIB report can be downloaded at no cost from the government’s dedicated CAIB Web site, caib.nasa.gov. The CAIB report is concise, often fascinating, often technical, and frequently heartrending. It succeeds in explaining the complex interplay between NASA management and engineering staff. Despite the vast depth and breadth of the report, a few key points are worth summarizing in order to provide sufficient background to the reader about what actually happened to Columbia. As to the physical cause of the accident the CAIB concluded this: The loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the Thermal Protection System on the leading edge of the left wing. The breach was initiated by a piece of insulating foam that separated from the left bipod ramp of the External Tank and struck the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panel 8 at 81.9 seconds after launch. During re-entry, this breach in the Thermal Protection System allowed superheated air to penetrate the leading-edge insulation and progressively melt the aluminum
